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Eamon de Valera
and the Rivalry that Led to War
By Julia W alsh‘12

When friends become enemies, the ramifications are disastrous. The two split and form
an intense rivalry to assert their dominance or prove that they were correct (if an argument is an
impetus for the split). However, some of the bitterest feuds occur when these close companions
compete with each other as friends. Such a rivalry weakens a friendship. It turns into a
competition where you stay friends to keep a closer eye on each other, fulfilling the adage: Keep
your friends close but your enemies closer. Consequently, a tipping point will ultimately sever
ties and cause a more intense enmity between the two—no matter how conciliatory they appear
to each other in person.
Such friendships are often present in the realm of politics. In Ireland, such a situation is
credited in helping to create a civil war. Though the charismatic Eamon de Valera and the mythic
Michael Collins had opposing views o f the Anglo-Irish Treaty, de Valera’s rivalry with Collins
also seems to have played a significant role in leading Ireland to Civil War.
These men both shared several similarities in their upbringing. Both de Valera and
Collins emerged from humble beginnings though their circumstance vastly differed. Both were
raised in rural Ireland without a father but with a strong foundation in Catholicism. Both had
female role models.1 But Dev was bom in the United States on October 14,1882—an
illegitimate child whose mother sent him back to Ireland to live with his grandmother in County
Limerick.2 Collins was bom on October 16, 1882, in County Cork, but into a large and loving
family.
“Both were marked by application to ‘the books,’ de Valera being the more obviously
studious and less rumbustious of the tw o.. ,”34*He grew up studying and developing a “passion for
mathematics”45and looked to become a teacher. But a deeper calling rose within—politics. This
stemmed from his second passion, the Irish language. In 1908, Dev joined the Gaelic League
which would serve as the catalyst to his revolutionary idealism of giving Ireland back to Ireland.3
Both were drawn to the desire to rise up against the British and took part in the Easter

1Tim Pat Coogan. Eamon de Valera: The Man Who Was Ireland. (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1993), 3.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid, 4
4 Diarmaid Ferriter. Judging Dev: A Reassessment of the Life andLegacy ofEamon de Valera. (Dublin: RIA, 2007.),
25.
5 Eamon de Valera, 11.
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Rising o f 1916. During the Rising, de Valera commanded the 3rd Dublin City Battalion which
Ferriter terms “something of a surprise since he was not in the Irish Republican Brotherhood
(IRB)”6 and did not join until later. In his role as commander, he had created battle plans, but
could not adapt them when less than ideal circumstances arose7 and suffered a nervous
breakdown. Regardless, he was the only commander to be spared from execution after the
Rising. (The dispute lies in how much, if any, his American birth played a role in saving him.)
Collins fought at the GPO (General Post Office) after joining the IRB in 1915. He too was jailed
afterwards. During his prison term, he began his ascent to power within the IRB.
Both men differed in their personalities. Dev, who was extremely tall and lanky, was
known as “Long Fellow” while Collins earned the nickname “Big Fellow” because of his “big
headedness.”8 He would not respect any man, no matter his position, unless they earned it. Once
a man earned his respect, Collins gave them his extreme loyalty.9 For example, though he did not
want to go to London to negotiate with Lloyd George, he followed the orders de Valera gave
him.
Collins’ approach to politics and war was “unorthodox [and] swashbuckling”10 He would
take over jobs even if they were not in his jurisdiction, occasionally making enemies (such as
Cathal Burgha).11 Dev, on the other hand, seemed to keep his loyalties private, often assuming
the role of a disinterested by-stander.12 Coogan describes Dev as an “aloof hierarchilist... with
his insistence on strict procedural behavior and observance o f spheres of influence.”13 According
to the historian, “Where de Valera went by the military manual, Collins rewrote it.” 14 But yet
these two men, though different, united together for a common goal—the freedom of the Irish
people. However, unity and accord would not last forever.
The Irish War for Independence commenced in January 1919. Michael Collins played the
role of military mastermind, while Eamon de Valera played the charismatic politician and sought
support from the Irish in America. Touring the country from April 1919 to December 1920, Dev
became the face o f Ireland for the American people especially since he was the President o f Sinn
Fein, “the official political arm of the republican movement.” 15
Collins and Dev worked as a pair. In order for him to get to America, he needed to get
out of jail. Collins was the man for the job. When de Valera was jailed in 1919, Collins
smuggled a master key into a cake, set up safe-houses, and then shipped him off to America.16
During his time there, de Valera did not always concur with the Irish-American groups. For
example, one incident caused the National Secretary o f the Friends of Irish freedom and Dail
deputy Diarmuid Lynch to resign.17 De Valera also clashed at times with John Devoy, the head
of the radical Clan na Gael. As a result, Coogan notes, the Big Fellow faced trouble with his
conflicting loyalties to Dev and the IRB especially because of the Lynch incident, but in the end,
Ferriter, 26.
7 Ibid.
8 Eamon de Valera, 121.
’ Ibid.
10
Ibid.
11 Ibid.
12 Ibid, 206.
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid, 122.
15 Alan J. Ward. The Easter Rising: Revolution and Irish Nationalism. (Wheeling, IL: Harlan Davidson, Inc, 2003),

122.
16 Eamon de Valera, ix.
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he sided with the Long Fellow.18
Back in Ireland, Collins “was running everything in sight, including the IRB... ” 19 While
his friend was campaigning for the cause abroad, Collins organized a different method of
military action against the British at home— guerilla warfare. One such act, Bloody Sunday,
clearly “illustrated the atmosphere o f terror and counter-terror in which Collins and the staff of
GHQ fought the war in Dublin.”20 On November 21,1920, Collins led an unexpected attack
against the British Secret Service, executing members who were sleeping or with their families
or lovers. In retaliation, the Black and Tans attacked a group o f Irish spectators during a Gaelic
football match. De Valera strongly admonished Collin’s style of fighting and consequently
returned to Ireland less than a month later. His haste also spurred from the news that Collins had
replaced Arthur Griffith as Acting President after the Sinn Fein founder was arrested.21
When de Valera returned home, he was greeted by men who extolled Collins which
further fueled the rivalry. It is reported that when de Valera reached Ireland and asked how
everything was going, the response was, “Great! The Big Fellow is leading us and everything is
marvelous.” ’22 Dev’s apparent reply: ‘“ Big Fellow! Big! We’ll see who’s the Big Fellow...’”23
Coogan says Dev thus sought to accomplish three goals at home:
[A]ssert his ascendancy over the colleagues to whom he was now
returning.. .securing dominance over Collins in particular.. .to keep control over
the Irish Americans, and.. .to take over the reins of the peace process and to work
himself into a favourable negotiating position with the British.24
However, these goals would prove to be difficult to accomplish since de Valera had been away
from Ireland for over a year; he was somewhat disconnected from the situation. This gave
Collins, who had never left Ireland, the upper-hand.25
Once de Valera returned, tensions began to rise. Dev appeared unsatisfied with how the
country was being run, and he constantly discussed his wonderful treatment in America.
Historian James McKay states that Dev’s time in America allowed him to keep his ideals, while
Collins, who had been constantly on the run, became “a hard-head realist and pragmatist.”26
Eventually his constant prattle frustrated Collins who once interrupted the Long Fellow and said,
‘“ Oh, I have it off by heart.”27 The strain of their friendship was becoming more evident.
Hostilities continued until July 9,1921, after the death of “405 RIC officers (many
Catholic), 150 military personnel and an estimated 750 IRA members and civilians.”28 Both
parties signed a truce, and de Valera agreed to meet with British Prime Minister David Lloyd
George to discuss preliminary Treaty negotiations. Dev did not go alone, however. To
accompany him, he selected Arthur Griffith, Robert Barton, Count Plunkett, and Erskine
Childers—but not Collins. Collins felt snubbed especially because of his position of power in

18

Ibid.
Ibid., 200.
Ibid., 191
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Ibid.
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McKay, 189.
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Ibid.
24
Ibid., 197.
25
Tim Pat Coogan. Ireland in the 20th Century. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 71.
26
James McKay. Michael Collins: A Life. (London: Mainstream Publishing Co., 1996), 190.
27
Ibid., 191.
28
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Ireland. Once they arrived in London, only Dev spoke to Lloyd George. The two met on July 14,
15,18, and 21. During that time, the British Prime Minister proposed that Ireland be granted
Dominion Status (like Canada). At this proposal, “de Valera informed Lloyd George that, in his
judgment, Dail Eireann could not, and the Irish people would not, accept these
proposals.. .Ireland’s right to determine her own destiny [he] declared to be indefeasible.29 In
particular, he detested the oath of allegiance to Great Britain and the clause that would allow
Northern Ireland “to vote itself out of the Irish State.”30 He would not accept any Treaty with
these two provisions; Lloyd George then warned him that discussion would be “impossible if
[Dev] continued to assert a right to negotiations on behalf of an independent state.”31 Dev
refused to participate in any more discussions with Lloyd George.
But negotiations had to continue. And the results surrounding the second round of peace
talks (which gave birth to the Anglo-Irish Treaty) continue to be debated today. For the next
round of negotiations which began in October 1921, de Valera removed himself from the talks
and sent a reluctant Michael Collins instead. There are several theories as to why Dev sent his
rival as his replacement. One theory is that he wanted to use Collins as the scapegoat should the
Treaty prove to be unpopular with the people or if the British would not compromise.32 An
article in the Boston Globe suggests jealously played a key role:
[It] [P]oisoned relationships among the founding fathers of independent Ireland and made
Civil War inevitable. De Valera, the senior figure of the revolution, could feel his power
slipping away to Collins’ military and organizational brilliance. Knowing that all the
revolutionaries’ aims could not be achieved, de Valera sent Collins to London instead of
going himself so the military hero could be a scapegoat for the failure to negotiate a
better deal.33
The Irish Times also claimed that Dev knew that he belonged at the London conference and
chose not to go.34 It would then appear that intense rivalry and discord in the Treaty process
would further drive these two prominent Irish men apart.
This is not the ubiquitous view, however. Diarmaid Ferriter, who recently wrote a critical
re-examination of de Valera, claims Dev sent Collins and Griffith because he “needed to avoid
compromising the Republic and to be in a position uncontaminated by negotiation.”35 He
believed that if the conference broke down, his role as Ireland’s President would be able to re
open it.36 McKay takes a similar view: the concessions the British government would offer were
ones that the President o f the Irish Republic could not make without compromising the Republic

29Maurice Moynihan, ed. Speeches and Statements by Eamon de Valera, 1917-1973. (New York: St. Martin’s Press,
1980.), 51.
30 Ibid., 56.
31 Ireland in the 20th Century, 97-8.
32 "Michael Collins' lost legacy: [City Edition]." Boston Globe (pre-1997 Full text), (1996),
http://www.proquest.com/, Par. 6.
33 "Ibid.
34 “Man Behind Myths.” Irish Times, (2007),
http://proquest.umi.com/DQdweb?index=10&did=136383847I&SrchMode=2&sid=2&Fmt=3&VInst=PROD&VTvD
e=POD&ROT=309&VName=POD&TS=125783254Q&clientId=8384. Par. 7.
3 5 F e rrite r.6 4
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itself.37 Edward Purdon also argues that the scapegoat theory “is certainly unjust and too
simplistic, considering the subtle, not to say machiavellian, nature of the president’s mind. (It
also ignores the sense o f moral scruple that he believed permeated his whole existence).” 38 In
either case, Dev’s self-exclusion would lead to trouble.
On December 6,1921, at approximately 2:30 AM, Collins, Griffith, and others signed the
Anglo-Irish Treaty which “created 26 counties, an Irish Free State with Dominion Status, [and]
recognised partition.”39 In addition, members of the Dail would have to take an oath of
allegiance to the king of England. These men acquiesced to British demands because they
believed this was the best Ireland could receive from Britain and could be used as a springboard
for an independent and united Ireland which was Collins’ “long-term objective.”40 The
negotiators also did not have much o f a choice. Lloyd George threatened to resume war if they
did not sign. Collins and the others knew that Ireland would not be capable of handling another
British onslaught.41 He also demonstrated an ability to be more pragmatic than extremist.
According to Coogan, “Collins was mindful of how Home Rule had been lost through sudden
changes in circumstance, such as the Phoenix Park murders.. .”42 Ireland could not take any more
risks.
Ironically enough, de Valera who was thought to be the more moderate of the two,
opposed the Treaty while the extremist Collins accepted it. Dev supposedly remarked, “I would
have gone and said, ‘Go to the devil. I will not sign’”43 To him, Collins abandoned the dream of
independence. In a press interview in January 1922, Dev said that men like Collins who accepted
the Treaty as an additional step were wrong because
To the world it will be made to appear that the Irish people ,who three years ago declared
in a most solemn manner their independence, now voluntary abandon their independence
and the republican form of government which enshrined it, and the distinct national
citizenship which accompanied it, to accept instead inclusion in the British Empire with
all its commitment; to accept common citizenship, and all its implications with the people
of Great Britain; to accept the British monarch or his representative as king in Ireland.”44
The Treaty’s terms enraged de Valera because they were not what he wanted at all.
Additionally, he felt disrespected because he was not consulted before it was signed. The Long
Fellow also accused the Big Fellow o f keeping him in the dark on purpose and claimed he should
have been consulted before they signed. Furthermore, he alleged that he did not hear about the
Treaty’s signing until the evening paper.45 However, this accusation is debatable since Dev was
the President, and he had sent them in the first place. It is hard to believe that a man of such
political power would be left uninformed. Regardless, he denounced the Treaty saying:
I am against this Treaty because it does not reconcile Irish national aspirations with
37 McKay, 214
38 Purdon, 19.
39 Ireland in the 20th Century, 102.
40 Ibid., 104.
41 Ferriter, 70.
42 Ireland in the 20th Century, 104.
43 Ibid., 68.
44 Moynihan, 95.
45 Ireland in the 20th Century, 106.
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association with the British Government...I am against this Treaty, not because I am a
man of war but because I am a man of peace. I am against this Treaty because it will not
end the centuries of conflict between the two nations o f Great Britain and Ireland. [The
Treaty is] absolutely inconsistent without position; it gives away Irish independence; it
brings us into the British Empire; it acknowledges the head o f the British Empire, not
merely as the head of an association but as the direct monarch o f Ireland, as the source of
executive authority in Ireland.46
Taking the position o f the idealist revolutionary, he could not possibly accept the Treaty. Perhaps
knowing the British would not change their mind, he sensibly sent Collins because it would keep
his conscience clear and his principles intact. Maybe he was repenting for the earlier snub. He
also may have reasoned that it would put him a better light than Collins, and his time away
would allow Dev to gamer much needed support. However, a majority of the Dail and the public
supported Collins and the Treaty because they desperately tired of war. In addition, McKay goes
so far as to suggest the Dail meetings became “not so much the Treaty itself, but the personal
standing of Michael Collins. In the end, and to a very large extent, the voting reflected the love
of or hatred for him.”47 Again, this allegation is debatable, but it has still managed to make the
history books.
If Collins and de Valera had tension before the Treaty, they certainly did now—and no
longer behind the scenes. According to Ferriter, Collins “consistently outclassed and out
performed de Valera... [His] determination to win any public opinion propaganda battles was
evident very quickly.”48 He worked tirelessly to revise the Treaty, especially the oath of
allegiance and the “Ulster provisions”49 to make it somewhat more acceptable. Thus, he created
Document No. 2 which according to former IRA soldier Frank Gallagher, was essentially a way
to protect “Ireland’s independence and unity”50 without any allegiance to the king.51
Clinging to the revolutionary ideals of 1916, Dev believed the people would rise up for
the cause because they “were faithful to independence and would endure for its maintenance as
much as they suffered for the establishment.”52 Dev offered Document No. 2 to the Dail on
December 5,1921, but withdrew the proposal four days later after Arthur Griffith proposed the
assembly vote on the Treaty. The majority accepted it, leaving Dev livid. Gallagher notes that
propaganda played a role in the withdrawal of the document. Someone who was against de
Valera attempted to use the document against Dev and “all who stood for freedom”53 by stating it
was no different from the Treaty except in rhetoric.54 Collins accepted the Treaty not because he
liked it but because it was the most practical option, especially when the other alternative was
war; the Dail and the people simply followed his pragmatism. But the withdrawal set in motion
another radical step for De Valera.
Having been foiled by the Big Fellow yet again, Dev sought a different plan o f attack.
Since Document No. 2 failed, he took a drastic step toward saving the chances of Ireland’s
46 Ibid, 109.
47 McKay, 230.
48 Ferriter, 69.
49 Ireland in the 20lhCentury, 103.
50 Frank Gallagher The Anglo-Irish Treaty. (London: Hutchinson & C o, L td, 1965), 176.
51Ibid.
52 Ibid, 175.
53 Ibid, 177.
54i B I D
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independence—a political gamble which, if successful, would show the people’s love of him
over Collins. He announced that if the Treaty was accepted, he would resign from the
Presidency. On January 7,1922, the Dail voted 64-57 to accept the Treaty. Two days later, Dev
resigned. (He subsequently lost re-election by two votes to Griffith.)
Flanked by his supporters, Dev walked out o f the Dail, creating a major rift in Irish
politics. Some supporters left because were strongly against the Treaty, such as Harry Boland,
Erskine Childers, Constance Markievcz, and Patrick Pearse’s mother. Others were IRA
commanders who planned to use violence to gain victory. They included: “Rory O’Connor,
director o f engineering during the war; Austin Stack, deputy chief of staff; Liam Mellows; Liam
Lynch; and Ernie O’Malley—and many others would accept neither the terms of the Treaty nor
the nature and personnel of the Provisional Government that was about to be setup as the British
authorities began the handover o f power.”55 Coogan notes that these IRA men:
[W]ere anti-Treaty because...[t]he Black and Tan War and the reprisals policy had
caused enormous economic destruction...This very poverty motivated [them] to continue
their struggle. They had fought in rags with nearly empty weapons and equally empty
bellies for a Republic, and they felt that a continuation o f their efforts would bring one as
assuredly as it had a dominion. Also, just as in 1916, the ‘gallant failure’ philosophy was
strong. The motivation for fighting had been to continue the tradition of a rising in every
generation, not the expectation of actually winning.56
The minority clung to this ideal and believed that it would be a fight worth fighting.
Others, like IRA Chief o f Staff Cathal Burgha, abhorred Collins even before the Treaty
and made no attempts to conceal it. Burgha personally despise Collins because Collins received
honors the IRA chief thought he deserved.57 Immediately when de Valera returned home, he
complained to Dev about Collins and his role in the IRB. But McKay notes he “weakened his
case.. .by saying he had been offered the Acting Presidency but had not taken it.”58 The historian
also writes that “Cathal was as jealous as hell.”59 Dev realized this fact, and once remarked,
“Isn’t it a terrible thing to think that a man with the qualities that Cathal undoubtedly has would
fall a victim to a dirty little vice like jealousy.”60 Perhaps, it was Burgha’s jealousy of Collins
that fueled the rivalry between the two and helped cause the war, not de Valera’s own jealousy.
However, Dev played the opponents off one another to “enhance his own prestige”61 while
playing the role of the “disinterested observer.”62 McKay also writes that Collins was not
unaware of Burgha’s jealousy. He felt that the wrath of Burgha and others targeting him.
Dev had threatened war if things did not go his way, and indeed, they did not. Civil War
was on the horizon, but, according to historian Alan J. Ward, Dev was “not really in control of
the Republican extremists. Instead, he followed in their wake.”63 The Easter 1916 mentality was
probably the best mentality to be embraced by Treaty opponents since the odds were so against

55 Purdon, 27.
56 Ireland in the 20"thCentury, 111.
57 Eamon de Valera, 190.
58 McKay, 189.
59 Ibid., 195
60 Eamon de Valera, 206
61 Ibid., 192.
“ Ibid.
63 Ward, 140.
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them. They had about 8,000 fighters while the Irish Free State Army numbered about 35,000.64
Before resorting to war, Collins, in another demonstration of loyalty to de Valera,
attempted to work out some sort of arrangement. The rivals made an agreement called the
Collins-de Valera pact. The pact would form a Cabinet of both pro- and anti-Treaty factions as
well as a coalition government. These would be created after an “intimidation”65 free election
and an accepted constitution.66 Collins’ supporters criticized him for the pact which Coogan
claims he accepted because o f “a combination of the foregoing reasons combined with a sense of
loyalty to the old friends who now oppose them.”67 (Collins had also suggested a plebiscite to
gauge what the Irish people really wanted. Dev was completely against it, probably with a strong
intimation he would lose).
However, two days before the June election, Collins denounced the pact. Part o f his
condemnation appears to have stemmed from his disputes with the British (who were disgusted
with the agreement) about the Irish Constitution. Lloyd George strongly disapproved of the pact
though Collins deemed it necessary.68 He also severely changed Collins’ proposed Constitution
because the Prime Minister did not think it was close enough to the Canadian Constitution which
was what he wanted to serve as a model for Ireland.69 Though able to gain some concessions
from the British, Collins ultimately abandoned the pact (perhaps as a trade-off). De Valera,
meanwhile, realized his ‘“ extremist support’ policy had backfired on him.”70 He then denounced
the Constitution—partly because o f ideology and partly perhaps out o f anger with Collins—but it
was not enough to win more Anti-Treaty seats in the government.
Civil War officially began on June 28,1922, after Collins’ men fired on anti-Treaty
forces that had seized Four Courts in April. The rebels were forced to adopt guerilla tactics as
their method of warfare. Though de Valera disapproved of such methods when Collins used
them before,71 he certainly seemed to support them now. This support is evident in his “‘wading
through blood’” speeches.72 He remarked: “Young men and women of Ireland, the goal is at last
in sight. Steady altogether; Ireland is yours for the taking. Take it.”73
The Anti-Treaty faction did not have the people’s support or large numbers nor did they
have much of a leader in de Valera. Critically Coogan, remarks, “.. .de Valera ‘lost the run of
himself on his return to Ireland from America insofar as he allowed his ego and jealousy of
Collins to govern much of his policy.”74 During the war itself, Dev laid low and only “reemerged to fight the general election of August 1923, during which he was arrested when
addressing an election meeting.. ,”75 He knew that this war would not allow him the same control
he had seen during the War of Independence76 and suffered a breakdown similar to the one he
had experienced in 1916. Within a relatively short amount o f time, the war became unwinnable,
especially when the Cabinet passed the Emergency Powers Act, which allowed the government
64
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“to execute irregulars for any act o f war it chose.”77 The Anti-Treaty forces finally surrendered
on March 24,1923, uneasily uniting the southern part of the nation once again.
Amidst the rubble lay immense physical damage to Irish property and landscape,
numerous causalities as well as deep “psychological wounds...between enemies who had
recently been friends.”78 In the destruction’s wake, Ireland lost two o f its strongest leaders. First,
Arthur Griffith passed away on August 12,1922, of a brain hemorrhage. More importantly,
Michael Collins met his demise ten days later after being caught in an ambush in his hometown
of County Cork. The organizer of the attack, Tom Hales, had been one o f Collins’ closest friends
and had endured torture to protect him during the previous war.79 Both deaths, especially
Collins’, left a huge void in the country and large shoes to fill.
Eamon de Valera rose out of the war’s ashes able to take a seat in the government he had
just fought against and continued the road of his long political career. In 1932, he was elected to
his first of several terms as Prime Minister and also served as Ireland’s president from 1959 to
1973. During his time in office, he was able to eradicate the parts o f the Treaty he detested, and
eventually got southern Ireland complete independence in 1949.
After what several historians call his less than exemplary Civil War behavior, Dev
worked extremely hard to re-build his public image. Though Collins had perished, he still needed
to bolster his image now that the Big Fellow was gone. Collins’ pre-mature death only added to
his legend. Dev was still competing with him. The biographies he approved tended to downplay
Collins’ role in shaping Ireland’s history or portrayed him negatively. De Valera would later
refuse to attend a memorial for Collins in 1957, saying it would be inappropriate.8081In addition,
Collins’ family was not allowed to erect a marble (only limestone) memorial beyond 300
pounds; he also refused to support to the Michael Collins Foundation (according to an article
Coogan wrote in a 2005 edition of the Irish Times.)
De Valera’s mission for approval would be an uphill battle. Critics, like Tim Pat Coogan,
have noticed his efforts and in his biography on the Irish leader, dubbed it “de Valera speak”
which “combines distortion with suppressio veri and bare-faced lying.”82 And while he was
successful in changing the hearts of many, ‘his enemies never forgave him.”83 To this day, de
Valera is more criticized than revered and though he accomplished a great deal during his long
tenure in office, the years of 1916-23 remain the most talked about period in his political life.
However, there are other writers who are attempting to come to a more unbiased
conclusion. For example, Diarmaid Ferriter called de Valera’s actions “practical politics”84
which successful politicians must engage in to “effectively exploit history.”8S Though Collins
died, he was still there to lead the country. An article in the Sunday Independent takes the
middle-ground. “It would be unjust to blame de Valera as the sole begetter o f this conflict, but

77 Ireland in the 20th Century, 121.
78 Ward, 141.
79 Ireland in the 20th Century, 121.
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with his great prestige he could have opposed it. Instead, he fomented it.”86 Another article in the
Sunday Independent by John Murphy blames the “demonisation” of Dev on the cult following of
Michael Collins and Coogan’s biographies which “have helped to glorify Collins and devalue de
Valera”87 He notes that others, particularly journalists, have jumped on Coogan’s anti-de Valera
bandwagon.88 These claims are “inconsistent with his egoistic preoccupation with projecting his
own greatness and with ensuring that history would record the rightness of his actions throughout
his career.”89
There is also a case in the Irish Times which states that de Valera merely represented the
views of his generation: “rural, frugal, patriarchal, agrarian, and pastoral.”90 This statement has
also been an attempt to reconcile his image in Irish history. It states he “recognized the
inevitability of change, viewed it was unease, and fixed his eyes nostalgically on his own
Victorian childhood.”91 Meanwhile, Scottish historian Dr. John Regan argues that “Historians
here have distorted the historical record for the past 30 years by propagating the State's
‘reinterpretation’ of its foundation which involved Eamon de Valera being painted as "a dictator”
and Michael Collins as a constitutionalist protecting democracy.”92
There are still those like Coogan who say “Dev’s success was “a triumph of rhetoric over
reality.”93 He was the man known was “The Great Splitter”94 who “split Sinn Fein, split the IRA,
split Cumann na mBan, split Clan na Gael, double split Sinn Fein, double split the IRA, spilt the
whole country...”95 He was “tough” but “difficult” and “did not tell his colleagues in government
enough, behaved irresponsibly after the War of Independence,” etc.96
But others who view him as a charismatic man who ‘personified, if not the ‘republic’ of
Easter 1916 then at least the aspiration to its fulfilment.”97 He was “a man who was of
international significance; a role model in the struggle o f small nations to chalenge and defeat
imperials in the 20th century...He was strategically skilful, and often masterful, when it came to
political tactics...”98Not to mention, he got Ireland its freedom - though “the modem

86 "'The Civil War was a joke, but it was an obscene and bloody joke'." Sunday Independent (2008),
http://proquest.tuni.com/pqdweb?index=8&did=1437640981&SrchMode=l&sid=3&Fmt=3&Vlnst=PROD&VType
=PQD&ROT=309&VName=POD&TS=1259813460&clientId=8384.
87 "Human side to a demonised Dev." Sunday Independent, (2007),
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tendency”99 has been to “disregard its significance.”100
Collins, on the other hand, “was a very hard man and nobody’s fool. As commander of
the IRA he arguably did more than any other individual to bring Lloyd George to the negotiating
table.” 101 Ward refers to Collins as “an authentic hero who stood well above de Valera in the
eyes of Irish nationalists.”102 A 2005 letter to the editor o f the Irish Times, said it best:
[W.T. Cosgrave] gave equal credit in the independence struggle to de Valera, for his
political leadership, and to Collins, for his military genius. The post-Treaty period was
mishandled by nearly everyone, including the British, who were determined to veto any
accommodation. De Valera had substantial, not petty-minded, grievances against Collins
in this period of intense power struggle. By signing the Treaty, without further reference
back, it was a short step to ousting de Valera from power within a month.103
No one person is at fault, nor does any one person deserve all the credit. It is arguable that de
Valera was merely trying to keep himself in the political arena—a survival of the fittest
mentality—regardless of what Collins’ plans were. His rival was “dangerous... [because] he
alone had the skill and the ability to get things done, and for that reason he had become a
powerful adversary.”104 But like Dev had a dislike for Collins, so too do historians have an
apparent dislike for him. An article in a 1998 issue o f the Irish Times, states that “de Valera’s
career was mapped from the beginning by former admirers who became his most hostile critics,
from Michael Collins through Joseph Connolly and Sean O'Faolain to Tim Pat Coogan. All
started in something like reverence and finished in something like condemnation.”105 These
biases are certainly reflected in present historical writings.
So was it de Valera’s jealousy of Collins that helped create Civil War in Ireland? Perhaps
so, but it is a relationship shrouded in legend, lies, and secrets. Yet it may not so simple.
Historians have their biases, and their opinions often permeate the works of Irish history, making
the line between fact and opinion difficult to see. Whether or not de Valera was jealous, it is
obvious that both de Valera and Collins had a passion to create a free Ireland at all costs. Both
thought their actions were for Ireland’s benefit. Their differences helped to divide a frailly united
government during the interval between the Truce and Civil War. Personal feelings do seem to
have played a large role in division for some, but so do revolutionary idealism and the Treaty
itself. And even in that relatively small space of time between truce and war, peace was only an
illusion for two stubborn friends were at war with each other.
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